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Introduction
Ever since the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, the European 
Union (EU) and its member states (from here onwards: the EU) have 
struggled to redefine their role in international cooperation on 
climate change. The EU’s international leadership on climate change 
that had been prominent in much of the 1990s and 2000s was 
seriously shaken in Copenhagen in 2009 (e.g. Groen and Niemann 
2013). While it has recovered slightly in subsequent years, including 
by putting more emphasis on coalition building with progressive 
developing countries, the EU is no longer unequivocally considered 
the international champion on climate change (e.g. Bals et al. 
2013). In addition to increased internal discord on climate policy 
(Skovgaard 2014), uncertainty about its own role and potential for 
influence in the international constellation are factors at play.
Concurrent with the EU’s attempt to redefine its role, the 
understanding of international climate policy and the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process itself has evolved 
significantly. Whereas the multilateral process had long been 
considered as the major forum of (international) climate policy-
making, it is increasingly recognised as one among several fora and 
instruments in the toolbox of multilevel governance. This system of 
multilevel governance evolves dynamically with different elements 
influencing each other. The fight against climate change is not 
decided at the UNFCCC; rather, decisions at various levels matter 
and interact. Having said that, the UNFCCC can and does provide 
an important impetus to, and anchor point for, the overall efforts. 
In this perspective, part of the task is rather to encourage, facilitate 
and reinforce action at other levels (see also Bodansky and Diringer 
2014).
Against this backdrop, this paper proceeds in three steps. The 
next section briefly reflects on the EU’s role towards the 2015 Paris 
climate conference that is expected to agree on “a Protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” applicable 
to all parties from 2020. Subsequently, we make the case for 
pursuing an agreement that focuses on providing a strong signal 
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and determining a clear direction for the long-term global efforts 
to combat climate change. Finally, we indicate main elements of 
such a Paris Agreement.
Reflections on the EU’s role towards Paris
Balancing Europe’s declining power through smart coalition 
building
The EU’s power position in international climate politics has 
changed dramatically over the past decade. Not only has the 
EU’s share in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions declined 
significantly, reducing its relative weight as compared with other 
major players (e.g. China and the US), but the EU’s power base 
has also eroded due to continuing economic stagnation and 
financial turmoil it has experienced since the crisis of 2008/09 
(also Skovgaard 2014). In other words, the lesson of Copenhagen 
– that the EU cannot base its influence in international climate 
politics simply on its structural weight – still holds, and is 
probably further pronounced in the run-up to Paris.
As a result, coalition building remains a priority. The EU 
enhanced its efforts at coalition building after the Copenhagen 
conference. In tandem with the offer to enter into a second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, its renewed and 
redirected diplomatic efforts, especially towards progressive 
developing countries such as the least developed countries and 
small island states (e.g. in the Cartagena Dialogue), paved the 
way for launching negotiations on a 2015 agreement in 2011 
(Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013). Delivering on the ratification of 
the Doha Amendment establishing a second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol and continuous diplomatic efforts towards 
(developing) countries with overlapping interests therefore 
remain a conditio sine qua non for successful EU climate diplomacy 
for Paris. This could be crucially enhanced by the EU backing of 
some of the key demands of progressive developing countries 
(adaptation/loss and damage, finance, capacity building) and 
priority support for these countries (including in targeted EU 
development cooperation under the new Multi-annual Financial 
Framework). Aligning progressive developed and developing 
country players also offers the important prospect of gaining 
leverage over the two heavyweights - the US and China.
New and greater relevance for EU leadership by 
example
Far from becoming irrelevant, EU “leadership by example” has 
potentially even greater relevance for the EU’s international 
standing than in the past. Climate action at home has traditionally 
been a major source of the EU’s international credibility, but 
has also been increasingly questioned in recent years (e.g. 
Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Bals et al. 2013). As the EU’s 
relative power position declines, domestic action as a source of 
international credibility arguably acquires additional relevance. 
With discussions on climate policy advancing and increasingly 
taking a long-term decarbonisation perspective, it becomes 
clearer that mid-term GHG emission reduction targets (e.g. for 
2025 or 2030) and reform of the flagship instrument of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – albeit important – are not the 
only elements required. Increasingly, attention needs to turn to 
complementary instruments that advance innovation and (large-
scale) investments for long-term decarbonisation in specific 
sectors and action areas (including heavy industry, transport 
and energy infrastructure, renewables, appliances and buildings 
efficiency, cars, etc.).
Advancing the internal policy framework will require a new 
balancing of interests. EU-28 diversity, with Eastern member 
states displaying different socio-economic profiles and energy 
infrastructures, needs to be acknowledged in the forthcoming 
2030 policy framework. Resolving the resulting internal 
disagreements, possibly in a big new deal that allows advancing 
the modernisation of the energy sector in Eastern member 
states, again offers the chance to showcase to the world that 
widely diverging interests can be reconciled.
Broadening the EU’s contribution through its Member 
States
European leadership by example does not have to be driven only 
by action at the EU level and by a GHG emission reduction target. 
For example, when it comes to the deployment of renewables or 
the enhancement of energy efficiency, member states have a wide 
scope for action, as is apparent from their varying track records 
in these fields (EEA 2013). Within the new context of “intended 
nationally determined contributions” that countries will bring 
to the Paris process, member-state policies and goals could in 
principle be put forward internationally next to EU-level climate 
action. Designed properly, both elements may well complement 
and reinforce each other. Bringing policy action beyond climate 
mitigation targets and emissions trading to the debate may 
actually support the narrative of co-benefits and opportunities 
of low-carbon economic development. Carefully broadening 
the international debate to action in areas that are of strategic 
importance for long-term decarbonisation, such as renewables 
and energy efficiency, could be helpful in this respect. In the 
possible/likely absence of binding national targets on renewable 
energy and energy efficiency in the EU post 2020, it is worth 
considering whether member states could have a stronger 
international role in promoting some of the related policies and 
measures they seek to implement domestically after 2020.
Broadening international discussions on climate policy beyond 
emission reduction targets can also occur beyond the UNFCCC 
context. “International cooperative initiatives” provide other 
forums for advancing this debate. In the bustle of these initiatives, 
the EU and its member states should carefully and strategically 
select and push those initiatives with the highest added value 
of international cooperation and potential for mutual learning 
and policy diffusion (e.g. heavy industry transition and efficiency 
standards).
However, it would be unrealistic to expect the EU – even if based 
on a renewed leadership by example – to be able to move the 
world towards sufficiently ambitious commitments in a 2015 
agreement. The leeway may be larger when it comes to pushing 
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for a durable, smart and directive design of the Agreement and 
general (in contrast to specific and quantifiable) commitments in 
this framework. We now turn to what such a design might entail.
Putting ‘Signal’ and ‘Direction’ Centre Stage
At the time of writing, countries have not yet put forward their 
“intended nationally determined contributions” for climate 
action post 2020. It is unclear how much these may close the 
gap between “business as usual” and action required to put 
the world on course for the internationally agreed objective of 
limiting global average temperature increase to no more than 2°C 
above preindustrial levels. It is widely expected, however, that 
these contributions will be insufficient to meet this objective. 
Furthermore, the longer we put off the transition required, the 
more expensive this transition will become and the less we will 
be able to limit climate change and its impacts, since the level 
of unavoidable climate change is constantly increasing. How can 
Paris 2015 help create and reinforce the required impetus under 
existing political circumstances? On what should the EU focus 
its efforts?
We suggest that Paris may contribute to creating the required 
impetus especially through two very much interrelated and 
interacting elements. The Paris agreement should thus give: 
1) A firm signal that increasingly stringent climate action is 
politically inevitable for all parties; and
2) A clear direction of the policy pathway towards realising the 
2°C objective.
Such a signal and direction are two sides of the same coin. A firm 
signal would provide direction to future climate protection, while 
a clearly determined direction is also part of the signal required. 
Both together have the potential to provide a clear orientation 
for investment decisions and policy development by private and 
public actors in a long-term perspective at sub-national, national, 
regional and trans-/international levels. This signal and direction 
would also provide the EU with assurances to further advance 
domestic policy development towards decarbonisation.
Creating Signal and Direction: Main Elements
The signal and direction are the result of a combination of several 
elements. Each element on its own is not necessarily essential to 
achieving the desired signal and direction but taken as a whole 
these elements are significant and should be considered by the 
EU. The strength of the signal and the clarity of the direction 
result from the combined effect of the elements, including:
• Long-term mitigation objective (phase-out) - Clarifying 
that achieving the established objectives of international 
climate policy (preventing dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system and the 2°C objective) 
entails phasing out GHG emissions in the second half of the 
21st century could greatly enhance their relevance for direct 
action. This would send a clear message to governments, 
investors and others. Long-term investments in GHG 
emitting technology are to be averted and action needs to 
be initiated immediately to fully decarbonise the economy 
within this century.
• Long-term objectives for other core areas - Long-term 
qualitative objectives for other core areas of international 
climate policy might provide further guidance to their 
targeted development and unlock potential to guide future 
action. They could point the way towards climate-resilience 
(adaptation), the continuous scaling-up of climate finance 
and re-direction of financial flows/investments (finance), 
and intensifying technology cooperation so as to enhance 
research, dissemination and deployment of low-carbon and 
climate-resilient technologies (technology).
• Commitment to direction - The signal and direction 
immanent in these objectives could be further reinforced 
by the commitment of each and every party to a continuous 
deepening of international cooperation towards achieving 
the long-term objectives.
• Structured commitment cycles - Since the mitigation 
commitments entered into in 2015 will need to be 
strengthened, provision needs to be made for regularly and 
flexibly ratcheting them up. Such a “cycle of commitments” 
could be based on: 1) clear requirements for parties to put 
forward strengthened future commitments at least every 
five years with accompanying information that facilitates 
their transparency, assessment and comparison; 2) a 
clear process of assessing and finalising the proposed 
commitment, and 3) provisions for easy adoption and 
expedited entry into force of new commitments (e.g. Morgan 
et al. 2014). It would need to proceed in tandem with the 
consideration of next steps on adaptation and ‘means of 
implementation’ (see below).
• Transparency and compliance - Deepening international 
cooperation requires trust and transparency, and the 
danger of free riding and cheating can undermine the 
signal the 2015 Agreement needs to give. Appropriate 
transparency provisions (discussed internationally under 
the heading of “measuring, reporting and verification” 
– MRV) and a mechanism for facilitating and promoting 
effective implementation (including through tackling 
related problems) provide a way forward. They can 
enhance confidence that governments are serious about 
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implementing their commitments and achieving the long-
term objectives and that implementation problems will be 
discovered and addressed effectively.
• Medium-term GHG mitigation commitments - The signal 
and direction of the 2015 Agreement will also depend on 
the ambition of the quantified mitigation commitments 
it contains for 2025 and/or 2030. These targets can be 
further strengthened by an obligation for each party to pass 
domestic regulations, legislation and policies to ensure 
their effective implementation by 2020 at the latest.
• Means of implementation - Finally, how serious countries 
are seen to be about combatting climate change will also 
depend on their action to provide the means for effective 
implementation in terms of financial support, technology 
and capacity building (for both adaptation and mitigation).
Some other elements may further reinforce signal and 
direction - For example, low-carbon development strategies, 
long-term financing strategies, and adaptation plans may all 
serve to enhance the long-term perspective required, as may the 
requirement to integrate long-term climate objectives into all 
relevant national planning processes.
Conclusion
Coalition building and leadership by example remain important 
cornerstones of an international climate strategy of the EU. This 
implies increased attention to: 
1) Offsetting Europe’s declining structural power on climate 
change through continued investment in smart coalition 
building and renewed leadership by example;
2) Implementing and highlighting strategically important 
policies beyond GHG emission reduction targets, including 
support for renewables, energy efficiency and core sectoral 
policies (industrial low-carbon innovation, cars/transport, 
buildings, infrastructure); and 
3) Exploring the potential for complementing EU-level action 
with showing leadership by example at member-state level, 
where important competences for these areas reside. 
On the road to the 2015 Paris Climate Summit, the EU should 
give particular consideration to the need to create a strong signal 
for a climate transformation and to provide clear directions 
for the path towards decarbonisation. Calling for a focus on 
signal and direction is not to lessen the urgency of stepping up 
action to address and counter climate change. Rather, it aims 
to contextualise and complement a focus on medium-term 
mitigation targets and financial support with the identification 
of additional elements that can help incite action ‘on the 
ground’ and provide the basis for sustained worldwide efforts by 
enshrining general commitments in long-term objectives and a 
process for getting there.
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